INTRODUCTION
What lessons should we draw from the financial crisis? Many scholars have addressed this question in narrow terms, focusing on specific reforms to the financial system. 1 The literature has remained remarkably quiet on the broader question of what lessons the crisis teaches about the theory of law and economics. This Article addresses this question in the realm of laws regulating complex systems. This realm includes, at a minimum, the fields of financial regulation, environmental law, intellectual property, and antitrust law. These areas (and many others) involve substantial problems of discontinuities, surprise, nonlinearities, and complexity, which create huge challenges for cost-benefit analysis (CBA) based on statistical probability functions. Furthermore, in these dynamic areas, the most important problems often stem from the least predictable phenomena, at least quantitatively. The Journal of Corporation Law [Vol. 40:1 This Article argues that for these sorts of dynamic problems the current theory of law and economics has proven inadequate. That theory treats law as if it were a mere transaction, much like the purchase of a good. Accordingly, it emphasizes attainment of equilibrium between costs and benefits, captured by the microeconomic concept of allocative efficiency. 2 This Article argues that at least for these dynamic systems, this ideal proves both unattainable and not terribly important.
It rests these conclusions primarily on two grounds. First, in a dynamic system with significant discontinuities and true uncertainties, complexity defeats optimality as a goal for legal decisions because optimality becomes impossible to calculate and relatively unimportant. 3 Furthermore, the financial crisis teaches us that the CBA substitutes neoclassical law and economics employs to cope with intractable problems of complexity and uncertainty-assumptions of rationality and perfect information-work very badly as guides to major policy decisions.
The second ground for doubting allocative efficiency's utility as a guide to law in this context is more institutional in nature. Law is not a transaction. Law by its nature provides a framework that influences, but usually does not control, resource allocation. Accordingly, most law is neither efficient nor inefficient. It simply provides the framework under which market actors seek to achieve efficient outcomes. Hence, it is often not possible to determine whether a law is efficient. Because law provides a framework, it should be thought of as more closely analogous to macroeconomic policy (which likewise influences but does not control resource allocation) than to the transactions that microeconomics typically focuses on.
These insights have profound implications for legal theory. They mean that law and economics' problems run deeper than the debate about whether to use neoclassical assumptions or assumptions from behavioral and institutional economics to "predict" which legal rules will prove efficient. Instead, these two problems-the dynamic nature of many regulated systems and the institutional place of law-undermine the use of efficient transactions as a legal model at least in the many areas of law that regulate complex irregular phenomena.
One can imagine a unifying role for legal theory combining law and economics to address complex systems that avoids these problems, but this new role would substantially change law and economics' focus, goals, and methods to make it more macroeconomic and less transaction-oriented, at least when it addresses the law of complex systems. Policymakers and scholars should focus on the shape of change over time, treating legal reform as an effort to countervail negative long-term trends, adopt a goal of avoiding systemic risks while keeping open a robust set of economic opportunities, and employ economic dynamic analysis, a method for bringing institutional economic insights to bear on legal problems. To be sure, no theory of law and economics captures all important legal goals. But, I argue that this approach, which I call an economic dynamic approach, does a 
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should test legal reform's efficiency by asking whether a proposed reform generates benefits commensurate with its cost. An efficiency goal therefore leads to invocation of CBA as a methodology for evaluating the desirability of legal changes.
In some fields, such as government regulation protecting the environment, health, or safety, CBA has played a major role in evaluating legal decisions. Since Ronald Reagan's presidency, a series of executive orders have called for application of CBA to significant proposed regulations. 19 The prestige that CBA has gained through the elevation of the efficiency concept as a guide to legal decision-making has empowered a part of the White House, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget, to review regulations, ostensibly to help ensure that a regulation's costs do not exceed its benefits. 20 OIRA, however, does not limit itself to application of an efficiency test, but instead engages in a rather free-ranging attempt to weaken regulation, even in cases where no CBA exists. 21 So, even in this field, where an executive order commands CBA, it often serves as a justificatory metaphor for actions taken on other deregulatory grounds.
In many fields, however, CBA works only as a justificatory metaphor without any actual CBA, in the sense of an analysis that quantifies costs and benefits in dollar terms. Instead, law and economics scholars often use neoclassical economic assumptions as a proxy for CBA, because they recognize that reasonably reliable CBA of many legal decisions addressing complex dynamic problems proves impossible.
A prototypical example of this use of neoclassical assumptions as a CBA substitute comes from Richard Posner and Robert Bork's pioneering work on antitrust. They argue for making efficiency antitrust law's primary goal. 22 But they also appreciate that mergers create uncertainty and work unpredictably, so they do not recommend CBA to evaluate a proposed merger's efficiency. 23 Instead, they assume that market actors contemplating 19 . See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1980-82) , reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988) (providing that an agency shall consider a regulatory impact analysis, including a description of a rule's costs and benefits, when proposing a rule).
20. See Sandra Zellmer, Treading Water While Congress Ignores the Nation's Environment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2323, 2392 (2013) (noting that OIRA's economic efficiency test has frequently been a "choke point" for proposed regulations).
21. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 7 (2013) (stating that OIRA frequently rejected rules in order to "reduce cumulative burdens" and to reduce complexity); David M. Driesen 51, 60 (1993) (claiming that OIRA review during the first Bush administration "focused primarily on political and policy issues" and CBA was "rarely mentioned").
22. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 90-91 (1978) (stating "the whole task of antitrust" revolves around "improv[ing] allocative efficiency without" disproportionately "impairing productive efficiency"); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 4 (1976) (arguing efficiency should be antitrust law's sole goal).
23. See BORK, supra note 22, at 124, 219 (stating that the trade-off between output restriction and enhanced efficiency cannot be measured); POSNER, supra note 22, at 112 (characterizing efficiency measurement as an "intractable subject for litigation"). The Journal of Corporation Law [Vol. 40:1 mergers are rational and possess perfect information (or at least very good information). 24 Because of these assumptions, they find it likely that mergers will generate benefits exceeding their costs much more often than not because the firms proposing them would only do so if the proposed mergers were efficient. 25 In other words, neoclassical assumptions become a functional substitute for carrying out actual CBA. In general, if one assumes that market actors are rational and possess perfect information, it would follow that they act efficiently very often. These assumptions suggest very little need for government regulation. 26 Accordingly, Bork and Posner favor much less stringent antitrust enforcement than prevailed at the time they began writing about these issues. 27 More generally, practitioners of neoclassical law and economics have been at the forefront of advocating deregulation in a host of fields, including, as we shall see, the area of financial regulation. 28 The perfect information assumption has led to refinements in financial economics furthering neoclassical law and economics' tendency to support deregulation. 29 In particular, the efficient market hypothesis teaches us, in its most commonly used form, that after a short while financial assets reflect all publicly available information. 30 Belief in the efficient market hypothesis has led Chicago School law and economics scholars, especially those studying financial markets, to conclude that markets are self-correcting and therefore in little need of regulation. 31 This does not mean that economic theory always supports deregulation. On the contrary, economic theory recognizes that markets often fail to incorporate all relevant costs. 32 For example, factory owners do not typically consider the harms pollution causes residents of surrounding communities. Economic theory recognizes that at least in some 24 . See, e.g., BORK, supra note 22, at 120 (relying on the assumption that firms behave as if rationally maximizing profits with perfect information).
25. See id. at 206-07 (suggesting a firm that chooses a merger over internal growth must be acting efficiently).
26. See, e.g., John B. McArthur, Anti-trust in the New [De] Regulated Natural Gas Industry, 18 ENERGY L.J. 1, 49-51 (1997) (pointing out the Chicago School's assumptions of "perfect information" and "other approximations to perfect competition" lead to the conclusion that "no regulation is the best regulation" in the area of anti-trust).
27. 
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Legal Theory Lessons from the Financial Crisis 61 circumstances, such "external" (to the market) costs justify government regulation. 33 But neoclassical law and economics scholars regularly argue for no regulation or less regulation and the assumptions they use tend to lead to deregulatory outcomes. 34 Even before the financial crisis, the project of basing law and economics on neoclassical assumptions generated controversy among law and economics scholars. From the beginning of modern law and economics the New Haven school, led by Guido Calabresi, assumed, in keeping with the teachings of new institutional economics, that individuals and institutions manifest "bounded rationality," meaning that they do not have perfect information and process information through a lens created by their habits, routines, and identity. 35 As law and economics increased its influence many legal scholars found that perfect information and rationality assumptions "assumed away" the most interesting problems in the fields they were studying. 36 The simplistic assumptions of neoclassical economics, however useful in constructing a theory of markets, seemed useless or even misleading in addressing many legal problems. 37 For example, Guido Calabresi's pioneering work recognizes that people may engage in risky behavior because they lack perfect information about the risk involved. 38 Hence, a lot of law and economics began to adopt, often without explicitly mentioning institutional economics, assumptions congruent with that school of thought.
Cass Sunstein has championed behavioral economics as a guide to legal policy. human behavior based on empirical observation. 40 Behavioral economics has given rise to schools of behavioral finance and antitrust law, which focus on financial actors' behavior. 41 Behavioral antitrust scholars sometimes explain empirical findings that mergers often destroy shareholder value by suggesting that mergers may often reflect the egos of empire building executives and therefore not prove efficient. 42 Neoclassical, neoinstitutional, and behavioral economics, however, remain united (to a degree) in making efficiency legal theory's primary goal. They might vary in their assumptions and therefore in their conclusions about what choices are efficient, but efficiency remains the goal they devote most of their attention to. Even though law and economics scholars recognize that other goals matter and a few even suggest that justice matters more than efficiency, the constant focus on efficiency in law and economics scholarship skews the field toward that goal. 43 In other words, the evolution of law and economics did not fundamentally change its transaction-focused microeconomic orientation.
This efficiency focus remains predominant even though scholars have cast doubt on allocative efficiency's normative value. Richard Posner sought to justify efficiency as a major goal for legal systems by linking efficiency to "wealth maximization," which he defended as a valuable normative goal for law. 44 In the 1980s, Ronald Dworkin responded to Richard Posner's claim that a wealth maximization goal justifies economic efficiency by asking if wealth is a value. 45 Dworkin's suggestion that wealth maximization is not a normative value for law led even Posner to doubt his primary normative defense of efficiency as a major goal for legal systems. 46 More recently, scholars have cast doubt on the relationship between wealth maximization and well-being. 47 An extensive psychological literature claims that increased wealth, past a basic minimum level, does not increase people's happiness. 48 Hence, scholars have cast grave doubt on efficiency's normative value.
Efficiency seems to live on as a legal ideal because of its image as a neutral goal (which I have questioned elsewhere) and because legal scholars claim that economists can tell us what measures are efficient, but that economists cannot do anything else. 49 This Article questions the claim that economists can tell us what legal measures are efficient in a significant class of cases, and the entire fields of macroeconomics and game theory show that economists do other things. 50 Although scholars have sharply questioned efficiency's normative value as an ideal for government, and economists have been known to do things other than predict efficient outcomes, law and microeconomics has influenced the law in a variety of fields. 51
B. Deregulation and the Financial Crisis
Leading economists such as Joseph Stiglitz blame neoclassical economics for the financial crisis. 52 They do so, in part, because neoclassical economics led to excessive confidence in financial institutions' ability to police themselves and therefore provided the "intellectual armor" justifying deregulation that set the stage for a disaster. 53 The activities creating the financial crisis became legal because of deregulation that began in the 1980s. 54 46. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 11-15 (explaining why efficiency has "grave limitations" as an "ethical criterion for social decisionmaking"); cf. Richard 52. See STIGLITZ, supra note 4, at xi (blaming the crash in part on the efficient market hypothesis). 53. Id. at xi, xvi-xvii (claiming that many economists provided the intellectual armor that the policymakers invoked in the movement toward deregulation after identifying the belief that markets are "efficient" and selfcorrecting as a core problem).
54. See DRIESEN, supra note 10, at 36-45 (listing the specific actions creating the financial crisis and the deregulatory decisions that made them legal). The Journal of Corporation Law [Vol. 40:1
Indeed, nearly everything that financial firms did to create the financial crisis was illegal under the regulatory regime put in place in the wake of the Great Depression. 55 This deregulation seemed sensible to policy-makers in both political parties in part because they tended to view markets as self-regulating, a view that appears to make sense if one sees market actors as rational actors possessed of perfect information and accepts the efficient market hypothesis. 56 In particular, the efficient market hypothesis cast doubt on the Keynesian view of markets as prone to wild vacillations from time to time and therefore on the need for structural regulation. 57 The translation of this hypothesis in the political sphere and to a large extent among academic lawyers steeped in microeconomics simply held that a transaction's existence usually proved its goodness. 58 The ideological climate that neoclassical law and economics helped create led to a dismantling of the regulatory regime put in place to prevent another Great Depression.
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, a major part of this regime, erected a wall between commercial and investment banking. 59 Thus, during a long period of post-World War II prosperity, no institution could both carry out commercial lending and underwrite securities. 60 This separation seems to have limited systemic risk by making it likely that a failure in one banking sector would not contaminate the entire economy. 61 62. See KRUGMAN, supra note 5, at 157 (pointing out that Glass-Steagall "protected the economy from financial crises for almost seventy years").
The ideological climate of the 1980s led the government agencies implementing Glass-Steagall to erode this separation. 63 This erosion paved the way for expanding the securitization of loans that led to the financial crisis. Lehman Brothers, Bear Sterns, Merrill Lynch, Citibank, and Goldman Sachs-large financial institutions at the heart of the financial crisis-persuaded the Federal Reserve Board to allow bank holding companies to both originate and securitize mortgages. 64 The key regulatory decision expressed faith in free market actors' ability to self-police by rejecting arguments that securitization would create incentives for making unsound loans, which is precisely what happened during the financial crisis. 65 Congress consummated the tearing down of the wall between commercial and investment banking by repealing key aspects of Glass-Steagall outright, thereby paving the way for a great expansion in the securitization of poor quality loans. 66 This repeal also allowed the growth of too-big-to-fail institutions-institutions so large that their demise would threaten the entire economy-which often combined both commercial and investment banking under one roof. 67 Repeal of traditional restrictions on interstate banking and the decline of antitrust enforcement also helped set the stage for waves of mergers that caused enormous growth in the size of the largest institutions. 68 Deregulation of mortgage lending itself also played a key role. Most of the subprime loans at the heart of the crisis were adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), consisting of a low introductory teaser rate that later reset at a higher rate determined by an index. 69 In the years prior to 2008, issuing of ARMs to subprime borrowers took off. 71 Numerous institutions, including many of the too-big-to-fail institutions, packaged these subprime loans into derivative securities, including collateral debt obligations (CDOs), which were frequently derived from mortgages along with other forms of debt, and collateral mortgage obligations (CMOs), derived from mortgages alone. 72 Two government-sponsored entities (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, pioneered securitization in the 1970s as a way to enable low income borrowers to purchase homes. 73 Private financial institutions competed with them vigorously in the 1990s, partially by securitizing subprime loans that could not meet the GSEs' underwriting standards. 74 When derivatives began to take off the enormous financial institutions with an interest in derivatives' growth lobbied to prevent their regulation. 75 They succeeded, first in dissuading the Commodity Future Trading Commission (CFTC) from regulating derivatives and then in cementing their victory by persuading Congress to generally strip the CFTC of its authority to regulate derivatives in the future and to preempt a centuries old common law rule preventing the enforcement of speculative derivatives contracts. 76 All of this deregulation set the stage for a debacle. 77 Subprime lenders ramped up their practice of offering risky and expensive ARMs to those least able to pay, knowing that they could sell them to larger financial institutions, who would bundle them into derivatives securities for sale around the world. 78 Underwriting standards began to decline, since subprime lenders off-loaded much of the default risk onto investors through securitization. 79 The derivatives sector had a value of about $36 trillion in 2007, about 259% of GDP, a size that makes the entire economy dependent on this one sector's continuing economic health. 80 In 2007, high default rates in the subprime lending sector caused a collapse of that sector. 81 This collapse occurred in part because housing prices declined, making banks reluctant to refinance ARMs given to low-income buyers. 82 Accordingly, their loans reset at high rates, which they often could not pay when the teaser rate expired. 83 This collapse did not immediately cause a major decline in the United States or the global economy because the subprime sector by itself was not large enough to have a very great impact. 84 The transmission of risk through securitization and the involvement of too-big-to-fail institutions, however, caused a financial meltdown on a global scale in 2008. 85 The largest financial institutions had become big players in creating, buying, and selling derivative securities. 86 Indeed, some of them had purchased subprime lenders in order to have a ready source of loans to securitize. 87 As a result of securitization, the collapse of the subprime lending sector threatened the existence of absolutely enormous financial institutions in 2008. 88 Regulators became acutely aware of this when asset prices sharply declined after Lehman Brothers' collapse. 89 That collapse generated a global credit freeze threatening the entire economy, as financial institutions recognized that they could not count on their 78. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 56, at 12 (discussing the largest subprime lenders' reliance on fraudulent loans in light of the ability to sell them off); ZANDI, supra note 69, at 38 (pointing out that ARMs make up three-quarters of subprime loans).
79. See ZANDI, supra note 69, at 33, 97-99 (describing the decline in underwriting standards for home loans and other types of loans). 88. See, e.g., JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 70, at 168 (noting Bank of America's survival was jeopardized when it purchased Merrill Lynch's subprime lending risk).
89. See KRUGMAN, supra note 5, at 178 (describing the fall of Lehman Brothers as the "triggering event" for a rapid decline in asset prices and a freeze-up of credit); POSNER, supra note 57, at 41-42 (noting that the government had thought the financial system stable in early September of 2008, but that a collapse followed the failure to save Lehman Brothers). Thus, deregulation provided an essential prerequisite for the crisis. 93 Without it, subprime loans in the form of ARMs, too-big-to-fail institutions, and a huge unregulated derivatives market would not have been possible. 94 Neoclassical law and economics scholars actively sought this deregulation with arguments that combined law and economics precepts with the ideological view they support: markets regulate themselves. For example, William Shuggart, writing in the Cato Journal, supported Glass-Steagall's repeal on the grounds that it imposes costs with "no apparent benefits for depositors." 95 He reached the conclusion that separation of commercial banking from investment banking generates no benefits through traditional neoclassical assumptions of rationality. 96 For example, he dismissed the argument that combining these functions encourages financial institutions to invest in risky securities that they underwrite or make unnecessarily risky loans (both of which led to the crisis of '08) by assuming that "a profit maximizing commercial bank undertakes investments in such a way that the ex ante risk adjusted rate of return . . . is at a maximum." 97 Similarly, Geoffrey Miller, a University of Chicago Law Professor, defended bank consolidation and the demise of interstate banking restrictions, which paved the way to 
See Shah Gilani, How Deregulation Eviscerated the Banking Sector Safety Net and Spawned the U.S. Financial
Crisis, MONEYMORNING.COM (Jan. 13, 2009 ), available at http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewarticle/articleid/2948569 (stating that deregulation spawned the subprime mortgage market, the accumulation of bad assets in enormous financial institutions, and ultimately, the financial crisis); Stout, supra note 76, at 3-4 (arguing that the CFMA, which removed constraints on derivatives trading, caused the 2008 Financial Crisis).
95. 
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consolidation. 98 He predicted (wrongly) that "geographically diversified banking . . . would enhance the safety and soundness of the banking industry." 99 But he focused on a case for mergers as "efficient," predicated on the assumption that if banks favor mergers they are likely to be efficient, thus echoing Posner and Bork's pioneering law and economics antitrust work. 100 He concluded that nobody has shown that the costs of "nationwide branch banking" outweigh the benefits. 101 Although this Article constitutes a thoughtful analysis by a very informed academic, it ends up blending technocratic argument based on efficiency-based thinking with the free market ideology this sort of thinking often supports. He chided Arthur Wilmarth for "distrust of markets" and pointed out that "market forces together with technological innovation" drive banking's geographic expansion. 102 Then, in a declaration of the true faith, he wrote: "For too long the regulatory system has impeded" market forces. 103 "[I]f interstate branching is economically efficient, it will benefit banking consumers and survive the rigors of competition; if not, it will not flourish." 104 He concluded: "Markets, not politicians or bureaucrats, should decide the future structure of the banking . . . industry." 105 In other words, markets self-correct, so no need for regulation exists. Daniel R. Fischel, then the director of the University of Chicago Law and Economics Program, echoed these views in supporting the demise of Glass-Steagall in 1987. 106 He (with two co-authors) argued that the concerns about conflicts of interest that underlay Glass-Steagall were misguided, because reputational concerns would lead banks to police themselves. 107 Once again, a rational actor assumption leads to the conclusion that markets regulate themselves.
After derivatives trading took off and bankrupted Orange County, California and Barings Bank, neoclassical economists rushed to defend derivatives against calls for their regulation. A Cato Institute policy analysis from a time when the CFTC showed some interest in regulating derivatives, for example, made the case for derivatives as a tool increasing market efficiency and then advocated "greater reliance on market forces" and self-regulation rather than on government restrictions of derivatives trading. 108 later, Congress followed this advice and instituted a moratorium on regulation soon followed by the permanent stripping of authority mentioned earlier. 109 Neither I nor the economists who list neoclassical economics (or in my case, neoclassical law and economics) as a cause of the economic crisis claim that it is the only cause. 110 For example, lobbying by financial firms certainly contributed to the deregulation that sparked the crisis. 111 But one cannot completely separate lobbying from neoclassical law and economics. The Glass-Steagall regime, when it was in place, divided the special interests. 112 Some had a financial interest in keeping Glass-Steagall in place and others had an interest in eroding its strictures. 113 So lobbying's existence cannot constitute a sufficient explanation for Glass-Steagall's erosion. As we have seen, neoclassical economic thinking's optimism about markets undergirded the erosion. Once GlassSteagall eroded and then fell, large financial institutions became much wealthier and much more unified in supporting deregulation. 114 Furthermore, as many scholars have pointed out, public choice theory-which emphasizes the role of special interest lobbying-cannot by itself provide a complete explanation for public policy choices. 115 We know that ideas and popular interests sometimes matter; scholars often cite environmental law, civil rights law, and the 1986 tax reforms as examples of laws that defy a public choice explanation. 116 Financial firms' lobbying proved successful in part because the deregulation they advocated seemed sensible to many policymakers. 117 The top people in many regulatory agencies come from Wall Street, a place where the efficient market hypothesis and the kind 109. See Markham, supra note 92, at 581-82 (describing the regulatory moratorium and the CFMA's effects).
110. See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 4, at 12 (blaming deregulation on a combination of special interest lobbying and "ideas that said regulation was not necessary"). 112. See Macey, supra note 63, at 715-17 (discussing the "political equilibrium" that kept Glass-Steagall in place for many years, including litigation by the securities industry opposing Glass-Steagall's erosion).
113. See Fischel et al., supra note 106, at 333 (noting that bank holding companies and local banks lobbied "for and against interstate banking proposals").
114. See Karmel, supra note 64, at 7-8 (stating that deregulation paved the way for massive institutions, like Citigroup, to challenge Congress to get rid of Glass-Steagall once and for all).
115. 117. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 56, at xviii (concluding that financial regulators chose a "handsoff approach" due to their "widely accepted faith in the self-correcting nature of the markets").
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Legal Theory Lessons from the Financial Crisis 71 regard for markets it supports has some influence. 118 Neoclassical law and economics certainly contributed to the acceptance of the deregulatory measures that made the crisis possible. 119
C. The Posner Defense
Richard Posner's post-crisis work seeks to separate neoclassical law and economics from deregulatory ideology. He characterizes the financial crisis as involving a depression and acknowledges that it constitutes a failure of capitalism. 120 He even states that deregulation played a role in establishing the preconditions for that failure, as I have argued, and calls for at least somewhat stricter financial regulation. 121 But he blames deregulation on free market ideology, specifically the belief that markets self-regulate, a belief, he argues, that many leading economists share with policymakers and business leaders. 122 At the same time, he defends rational actor assumptions and CBA. 123 In this way, he tries to decouple neoclassical law and economics from deregulatory ideology.
The material provided above shows why Posner's effort to decouple free market ideology from neoclassical law and economics fails. The ideas that neoclassical law and economics rests upon, namely, the assumptions of perfect information and rational market actors, support a presumption in favor of unfettered markets and therefore provide intellectual support for free market ideology, including the notion that markets selfregulate. The efficient market hypothesis provides additional (and related) support for the belief in markets' capacity to self-regulate. Furthermore, we saw that some regulatory decisions, like the decision to allow banks to simultaneously originate and securitize loans, relied on the neoclassical model. In short, neoclassical law and economics has a close relationship to the belief that markets self-regulate often enough to create a presumption against regulation. 124 Finally, we have seen that law and economics scholars recommended deregulation, combining the sort of technocratic efficiency arguments Posner has 118. See TETT, supra note 56, at 39-40 (linking the success of industry lobbying on derivatives to Clinton Administration officials' Wall Street ties and their own belief in the desirability of avoiding regulation); Topham, supra note 67, at 141-42 (attributing the "deregulatory zeal" of President Clinton's working group that recommended exemption of derivatives to Wall Street ties and to the efficient market hypothesis).
119. See Topham, supra note 67, at 133 (characterizing Glass-Steagall's repeal and ending derivatives regulation as results of the efficient market hypothesis and the capital asset pricing model).
RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION IX, 236 (2009).
121. See id. at 106-07, 242-43 (arguing for financial regulation and stating that government "inaction" contributed to the crisis); POSNER, supra note 57, at 13 (stating that deregulation helped cause the economic collapse by making banking "unsafe"); cf. POSNER, supra note 120, at 116 (worrying that financial crisis may cause a "swing to excessive regulation"); POSNER, supra note 57, at 193-209 (arguing against proposals to make originators of mortgages maintain a minimum equity interest after securitization, oversee credit rating agencies, and establish a consumer financial protection agency).
122. Much of Posner's work on the financial crisis, however, distracts the reader from neoclassical law and economics' failure as a legal theory, by focusing on neoclassical economics' value as a tool for describing market behavior. He does this by adopting a very capacious view of rationality and by shifting his focus institutionally to create an apparently plausible case for a rational actor model as a predictive tool where none appears to exist. Jonathan Macey and James Holdcroft describe the large banks' tendency to mimic each other's pursuit of profits from derivatives in the face of mounting evidence of rising default rates as "lemming"-like, thereby suggesting irrationality or at least bounded rationality. 127 Richard Posner, however, recasts this same behavior as an example of rational behavior by focusing primarily upon actors within the firm. 128 He cites the problem of inexperienced traders having too much enthusiasm for the newfangled securities, even while conceding that at least in some cases (and perhaps many) the direction to ramp up risk came from "senior management." 129 He says that firms tend to pay more attention to their traders' views than to those of their risk managers because trading serves as a profit center. 130 He does not explain why paying more attention to the views of people generating profits than to those who help one avoid losses is rational in the face of mounting evidence pointing toward pending losses; indeed, some firms did adjust their behavior to avoid losses or realize profits from the subprime lending debacle. 131 128. See POSNER, supra note 120, at 77 (expressing skepticism that financial managers' rationality failures explain the crisis and substituting a "narrative" of "intelligent businessmen rationally responding to their environment").
129. See id. at 80-81 (describing a situation where senior management of Citigroup made the decision to increase risk).
130. Id. 131. See TETT, supra note 56, at 140 (explaining that Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan Chase's CEO, backed staff who believed that derivatives of mortgages were too risky).
at odds with the perfect information assumption in neoclassical economics and seemingly at odds with his own assumption that managers must have known about the potential for a housing bubble to burst. 132 He discusses the problems of properly understanding complex derivatives, a problem that seems to suggest a model of bounded rationality, accepting that people do not have enough time or capacity to understand overly complex financial instruments. 133 He characterizes the tendency to "follow the herd" as rational behavior and therefore sees bubbles as "rational responses to uncertainty." 134 He also treats the panicked reaction of investors in economic collapses as a rational response to uncertainty. 135 Charles Kindelberger, one of the leading economic historians of bubbles, expressed very different views, seeing the herd-like tendencies that tend to create excessive optimism as bubbles develop and panic precipitating crashes as examples of irrationality, which economists assume away by employing neoclassical models. 136 Posner may be correct to claim that his arguments show that the line between rationality and irrationality blurs. 137 But the world he describes fits the new institutionalist model of bounded rationality and limited information very well. He has to stretch the rational actor model beyond its typical bounds to make it fit his observations. 138 Indeed, his view makes any human behavior short of outright insanity fit the rational actor model. 139 This capaciousness, however, destroys the arguments that Posner and others have typically used to support the idea that they can predict the efficiency of legal rules when lacking the data necessary to conduct a reliable CBA. That idea, as we have seen, is that market actors' rationality will generally lead to bargains producing efficient outcomes. If, however, our conception of rationality expands to embrace the full range of human conduct that might arise among people not demonstrably insane, such as exuberance in the face of rising asset prices and panic as they fall, then we cannot predict that private bargains will 132. POSNER, supra note 120, at 77-78, 80-81 (claiming that managers must have been aware of the housing bubble discussed in the financial press and elsewhere, but that problems of "communication and control" may have contributed to taking on additional risk anyway).
133. See id. at 81-82 (describing the effect of complex instruments on financial organizations); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 11-13 (explaining that disclosure fails because people cannot understand complex structures).
134. See POSNER, supra note 120, at 84-85 (describing the tendency to follow the herd as "risky but not irrational" and bubbles as "rational responses to uncertainty").
135. See Posner, supra note 6, at 275 (describing the tendency to "freeze" in response to a sharp downward trajectory as a "rational response").
136. Although Posner supports some modest near-term regulation, he calls for waiting to enact major structural reforms. 142 Posner wants to wait until we have the information needed to properly assess the costs and benefits of restructuring. 143 When will that day come? My answer is never. We will never know the costs and benefits of any major proposal to restructure the financial industry, for reasons that are important not just to financial regulation, but to the law and economics of complex systems more generally.
II. COMPLEXITY AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF PREDICTING A MEANINGFUL EQUILIBRIUM
Complex systems make it impossible to predict whether a particular legal rule will approximate optimality. 144 Such systems also change so often and unpredictably that any equilibrium would prove temporary and therefore trivial. 145 This section demonstrates these points primarily through discussion of the financial system prior to the crash of 2008, and then explains that other complex systems share the characteristics that defeat optimality, relying on analyses cited in the margins to support my characterizations of nonfinancial examples more fully than a single Article can.
The financial crisis reminds us that our financial markets are complex, dynamic systems. 146 Lending to subprime borrowers involves a lot of uncertainty. 147 The use of ARMs for this purpose means that the amount of money that our least economically capable borrowers must pay can go up by an unpredictable amount when a teaser rate 141. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 54-57 (discussing findings about people's shortcoming in thinking about the future).
142. See POSNER, supra note 120 (describing some "piecemeal reforms" that "may be . . . helpful" but characterizing them as "pretty small beer").
143. See POSNER, supra note 120, at 296 (saying that we "should wait" to adopt major regulatory reforms until "we get a clear idea" of "what the costs would be" after explaining that we do not know how to value the benefits of major reforms). 145. See generally Kelman, supra note 11, at 1220 (suggesting that allocative efficiency may be "relatively trivial" and that its pursuit may "interfere with social welfare gains").
146. See Baxter, supra note 126, at 867 (characterizing the financial markets as "dynamic" and "complex"). 
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Legal Theory Lessons from the Financial Crisis 75 expires. Neither the lender nor the borrower can predict the precise interest rate that will govern the majority of the loan's term (absent refinancing), which creates risks that either or both will underestimate a loan's cost and therefore overestimate the buyer's capacity to repay the loan. 148 On the other hand, if housing prices rise, borrowers often can refinance, for a fee, and get a new teaser rate. 149 This possibility, however, creates a risk that borrowers and lenders will not take the problem of paying more when an ARM resets to a higher rate seriously enough and therefore agree to imprudent loans. 150 Borrowers' ability to pay can also vary depending on whether they keep their jobs, retain their health, and other variables. 151 Hence, financial markets are complex both in the sense of containing many uncertainties and of having a large number of potentially relevant (and often uncertain) variables influence outcomes. 152 Financial markets also contain many feedback loops, so that one part of the system can produce an effect in another part that exacerbates the problem in part one. 153 So, for example, declining housing prices make refinancing impossible, thereby causing ARMs to reset at a higher rate, triggering more defaults. 154 The defaults produce abandoned and foreclosed homes, creating a glut of houses for sale causing further price declines. 155 Thus, price declines create a feedback loop that causes additional price declines. 156 This sort of complex system often operates in a non-linear fashion rather than in a smooth predictable manner. 161 Using historical data about default rates, they could estimate how high an interest rate they should charge in order to compensate themselves for default risks. 162 Any mathematical model makes simplifying assumptions in order to make prediction appear possible. 163 A very common assumption is that the future will closely resemble the present. 164 This assumption makes it possible to use data, which exist (if they exist at all) for the past only, not for the future. In the case of mortgage lending some financial institutions modeled deviations from the immediate past, namely the possibility of localized declines in housing prices. 165 But none of the modelers looked at a nationwide decline in housing prices because we have no data about such a rare event. 166 Nor did any of the models consider the possibility of declining underwriting standards because this problem developed fairly late in the game and did not yield statistical data. 167 Data about the past rarely yield mathematically accurate predictions of 162. See Gerding, supra note 159, at 146-47 (pointing out that regulators took a hands off approach when dealing with subprime mortgage lenders because regulators assumed lenders accurately managed risks using "advanced" models to maximize profits).
163. 167. See TETT, supra note 56, at 251 (discussing the problem of originating too many subprime mortgages on "increasingly silly terms" while using models deemphasizing the "human issues"); Miller & Rosenfeld, supra note 166, at 822-23 (arguing that banks' blind reliance upon academics' models, which ignore strategic behavior, had disastrous consequences).
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the future for complex systems. 168 Although minor variations do not necessarily make them useless for traders, for legal decision makers models must capture unusual future events to be useful. And that is precisely where models fail. 169 It is theoretically impossible for a functioning financial market to be in the equilibrium that the neoclassical model of perfect information imagines because financial markets depend on imperfect information for their very existence. 170 Trades arise precisely because buyers and sellers have different views of the future value of financial assets. 171 Thus, the notion of a perfectly efficient market, in this context, constitutes a mirage.
As Richard Posner concedes, in such a dynamic context, policymakers cannot carry out CBA of proposed legal reforms. 172 CBA can handle situations of risk, where probabilities are known, by multiplying potential future costs and benefits by the probability of their occurrence. 173 But where true uncertainty prevails-where probabilities are not known-we cannot calculate future benefits through a probability function. 174 Posner also notes that economists use two techniques to address true uncertainty and finds neither satisfactory. One involves simply assuming that probabilities are low even when no evidence supports this view. 175 Many economists have done this in addressing the possibility of a climate catastrophe within integrated assessment models designed to model the costs and benefits of mitigating climate disruption. 176 As Posner explained, 168. See TETT, supra note 56, at 252 (chiding bankers for "treat[ing] their mathematical models as if they were an infallible guide to the future, failing to see that these models were based on a ridiculously limited set of data"); Miller & Rosenfeld, supra note 166, at 821-22 (indicating financial markets, much like weather systems, are "difficult" to model reliably). Financial institutions, knowing that lending involves some risk, (including some risks that models may miss) tried to reduce their risk by selling CDOs and CMOs to investors. See ZANDI, supra note 69, at 116 (noting that in the "originate-to-distribute" model banks "didn't own the loans" and therefore "didn't bear the risks" associated with the loans packaged into securities). These sales, of course, increased risks to investors. Securitization does not decrease overall systemic risk; indeed, derivatives trading spreads potentially confined risk throughout the global economy. We saw in the previous section that when housing prices broadly declined and default rates increased, the securitization spread the risks to central financial institutions throughout the world, thereby freezing global credit and reaching the rest of the economy.
169. See Wilmarth, supra note 125, at 345-46 (describing how financial models dangerously focus risk managers on the probability of loss thereby diverting attention from the "potential magnitude of loss").
170. 181 For example, if you roll two dice once, the sum of the resulting numbers is uncertain; if you roll them many times, the sum of the two numbers averages seven. Monte Carlo analysis is the appropriate technique in cases where, as with a roll of the dice, the specific outcome is uncertain, but we know the probability distribution with certainty. 182 Unfortunately, such cases are quite rare; more often, Monte Carlo analysis hides the arbitrary judgment lurking below the surface of the analysis in the selection of a probability distribution in the teeth of unknown probabilities. 183 Another expert elicitation technique, called Bayesian probability, is, like Monte Carlo analysis, appropriate under narrowly defined circumstances but vulnerable to abuse when used more broadly. 184 Bayesian analysis begins with the important observation that the best available estimate of the probability of an uncertain event often depends on the extent of relevant prior knowledge and goes on to develop methods for revising probability estimates as knowledge changes. 185 In practice, however, economists often use it to incorporate ad hoc estimates from experts in relevant fields. 186 Here the potential for 177. POSNER, supra note 8, at 52-53 (explaining that "climatologists cannot . . . assess the probability" of a catastrophe).
178 Absent good data or a solid basis for extrapolation from data, expert calculation of future consequences' timing and magnitude is unlikely to be very good. 189 Indeed, some economists and a mathematician have argued that for some important types of uncertainty, the Bayesian theory of decision-making may be neither realistic nor necessarily rational. 190 In cases of true uncertainty, habitually calling probabilities low just because a plausible outcome is disastrous dangerously misleads policymakers. 191 In such cases, using expert elicitation to generate numbers for a CBA misleads policymakers by masking uncertainty with apparently precise numbers that better reflect the chosen expert's proclivities or the framing of the questions posed than reality. 192 This problem of complexity making identification of an efficient outcome impossible or arbitrary and unreliable exists not just in the area of finance (as we have seen), but in a lot of other areas as well. Climate disruption is one such area, partly because future warming depends on unpredictable economic growth rates and also because the physical system governing the climate is extremely complex and incompletely understood. 191. In fact, this is exactly what happened leading up to the financial crisis. In the face of true uncertainty, experts created financial models with simplistic assumptions. Miller & Rosenfeld, supra note 166, at 821-22. These models assigned a low probability to a declining housing market and many models failed to assign any probability to declining underwriting standards. 196 But nobody can predict how much innovation such an architecture will stimulate or the dollar value of using a more closed architecture optimized for particular uses. 197 Accordingly, nobody can provide a CBA quantifying the costs and benefits of various architectural choices. 198 Similarly, we cannot know the optimal term of a copyright or patent. 199 For we cannot predict how much innovation the expiration of a term might facilitate by lowering the costs of access to works, or how much innovation the added incentive of a limited monopoly will generate for an initial innovator. 200 I do not mean to claim that nobody ever predicts anything in areas of complexity. But the magnitude, probability, and timing of the most important consequences, which we must know in order to calculate an optimum, become impossible to specify in a complex system. 201 These consequences resisting quantification include catastrophes from climate disruption, the possibility of a crash leading to a financial depression, and how the innovation rates change when we alter the terms of intellectual property rights or change the internet's architecture-in short, matters of vital importance to economic growth on the one hand and possible calamity on the other. 202 Economists readily recognize that the models used to try to optimize complex systems often leave out or greatly underplay these crucial variables, which often make prediction subject to an enormous amount of uncertainty. 203 To the extent policymakers or lawyers treat probabilistic models of complex systems as reasonably reliable guides to regulatory decisions, they ignore the caveats of many responsible modelers. 204 Furthermore, in a dynamic system any achievement of equilibrium would prove very short-lived, and hence, trivial. 205 For example, even if one somehow could spend the amount of money to ameliorate climate disruption that equals the value of the damages avoided in one time frame, one might encounter a "tipping point" that radically exacerbates climate impacts in the next time frame. Greenhouse gas emissions accumulate in the atmosphere and remain there for decades or even centuries, so that any amount of emissions in one time period increases the likelihood of crossing a critical threshold later on. 206 For dynamic phenomena, an optimal solution in one time frame will rarely prove optimal in another. 207 Saying that government cannot calculate what legal rules will prove efficient in many contexts because of complexity does not imply that analysis is useless. Experts can give us important information to guide policy decisions. For example, a scientific consensus teaches us that greenhouse gases cause climate disruption and will produce serious problems in the future, even though science cannot tell us the precise magnitude, timing, and location of climate disruption's significant effects. 213 Similarly, several economists and academic lawyers predicted the financial crisis. 214 They too could not predict its magnitude or timing, but they did suggest it would occur (including, in the cases of Nouriel Roubini and Arthur Wilmarth, many details about what sorts of failures to expect). 215 Experts on Iraq could not predict the war's cost, but they emphasized a serious risk of sectarian and anti-U.S. violence and accurately predicted specific consequences from such an outbreak. 216 They also recommended specific steps to minimize the consequences that they accurately predicted. 217 In short, analysts often know a lot about the shape of change over time. Experts examining dynamic systems can often predict negative outcomes that we would want to avoid, at least qualitatively, and suggest steps to ameliorate or avoid negative outcomes. They cannot, however, quantitatively predict the magnitude and likelihood of predicted effects. Accordingly, their analysis becomes useless if we insist on viewing government as an optimizer because expert analysis accurately predicting trends in complex areas tends to be qualitative and therefore of little use in a cost-benefit framework. But such qualitative analysis can be quite useful if we have a more realistic and limited view of government's role, as we shall see.
In short, complexity makes optimality unachievable in practice for governments and trivial in principle. Adopting an efficiency goal in complex contexts provides a framework ill-suited to effective use of the type of information that knowledgeable experts can generate in spite of uncertainty. 215. See generally Wilmarth, supra note 125 (discussing the shift of large firms' borrowing from banks to capital markets, the decline of bank profit margins, and the creation of a two-tiered banking industry, among other things).
216. See Byman, supra note 195, at 58 (describing the possibility of Iraqi soldiers turning to banditry and the possible negative effects of the sudden release of several hundred thousands of young men into society); see also CRANE & TERRILL, supra note 195, at 1 (explaining American experiences with poor post-conflict planning and additional complications related to the cultural differences within Iraq). Accordingly, Posner's suggestion that restructuring economic regulation should wait until we have sufficient information to calculate regulation's costs and benefits amounts to a call for indefinite postponement. This day will never come. We might identify a package of reforms that would help us avoid another economic collapse. But we can never guess the magnitude and probability of the collapse avoided or properly predict the dollar value of the reform's costs. 218 Reliance on an economic efficiency model predicated on CBA works well as a justification for never figuring out how to properly regulate financial markets and other complex systems. 219 But if our goal involves rational regulation of systemic risk, it is useless. 220 And the CBA-substitute used in many areas of financial regulation, the neoclassical assumptions of rationality (traditionally defined) and perfect information, dangerously misrepresent the complex dynamic world we live in. Indeed, they assume away the problem of bubbles leading to crashes, the problem at the very heart of any serious treatment of systemic risk.
III. INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS MAKING EFFICIENCY AN ELUSIVE GOAL FOR GOVERNMENTS
Although neoclassical law and economics treat law as if it were a mere transaction, laws governing complex systems are not transactions. Enactment and reform of laws create rules, which usually remain in place for a long time. As such, they provide a framework. And market actors can carry out a variety of transactions, many of them unpredictable, under the framework that law provides.
A good example of this comes from the rule the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently promulgated to allow shareholders access to the proxy voting processes that corporations use to elect directors. 221 This rule, however, does not give the government control over who gets to run, let alone who gets elected. And nobody can predict in advance what decisions shareholders or managers will make with or without proxy access. 222 Nor can anybody predict how much value a corporation would gain or lose under one or another director. 223 The SEC cannot monetize the costs and benefits of proxy rules to predict whether any particular proxy regime will prove efficient or not, because the government influences but does not control shareholders and managers' choice of transactions. 223. See id.; cf. Kraus & Raso, supra note 144, at 308-09 (discussing an economic literature on whether boards containing dissidents or potentially challenged by dissidents performed better).
224. See Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148 (noting that the SEC recognized that proxy contests offer "potential benefits of improved . . . company performance"). The Business Roundtable court found the SEC's
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Legal Theory Lessons from the Financial Crisis 85 financial regulation usually has a very unpredictable and indirect influence on actual transactions allocating resources makes reliable CBA impossible for financial regulation generally, not just in the proxy context. 225 Antitrust law provides another example of how law typically provides a legal framework that does not control market actors' choices and therefore operates unpredictably with respect to efficiency. The antitrust approach that prevailed until the 1970s tended to restrict mergers. 226 relatively small companies this approach encouraged might pursue or how they would operate. Surely these companies would strive to please customers who would buy their goods only if the quality and price met their needs. So, the market would tend to pursue efficiency under this framework. When the antitrust law, in keeping with Posner and Bork's teachings, became more welcoming of oligopoly, this welcome mat did not determine how many companies would choose to merge or whether the mergers were wise. 227 Companies would make their own choices about mergers. And after they make these decisions, the companies make their own decisions about how to allocate resources-how and whether to innovate, how to make their products, and how to manage their workforce, thereby pursuing efficiency within a more permissive antitrust framework. Hence, government choices do not determine the transactions private parties would carry out. These examples reveal a hidden truth about regulation: Regulatory decisions rarely control resource allocation. Yet, the entire rationale for treating regulatory decisions as microeconomic transaction-analogues rests on viewing them as resource allocating. 228 To be sure, rules can often influence resource allocation. 229 But the transactions that market actors freely choose within a legal framework usually determine efficient outcomes, not the rules establishing the framework under which these choices take place. Therefore, one cannot reliably say what legal rules will prove efficient.
The major exception to this rule that regulations do not allocate resources comes from a declining form of regulation: price controls for regulated industries. In many cases, the government did control resource allocation in these regimes, for example, by choosing what sorts of investments utilities could make with the support of government bonding or compensation through public utility commission rate-setting. 230 Furthermore, in non-regulatory spheres, government decisions sometimes do control resource allocation. Government procurement, for example, controls resource allocation and an efficiency ideal should inform such decisions; knowledgeable government purchasers should be able to gather enough information to make efficient procurement decisions in most cases. When government becomes a market actor, the efficiency norms economists have developed to model markets become an appropriate and reasonably tractable guide to government action. 508-14 (1984) (stating that some state utility commissions must grant approval before a utility can construct a new nuclear plant and suggesting that many have authority to decide whether to reimburse a utility for its costs through a rate increase).
Similarly, taxing and spending allocates resources and one can analyze tax efficiency. 231 Still, analysis of taxing and spending often takes the form of macroeconomic analysis. 232 Indeed, in the wake of the financial crisis many analysts evaluated fiscal decisions in terms of their capacity to provide economic opportunities leading to growth, not in terms of their efficiency. 233 But regulatory decisions rarely determine resource allocation. And hence, especially in complex contexts, demanding that the government refrain from acting until it knows whether its actions are efficient or not often constitutes an impossible demand. Indeed, a major rationale for capitalism involves government's inability to amass sufficient information to make efficient resource allocation decisions. 234 We rely on markets precisely because government cannot determine whether its actions are efficient, except in very narrowly defined contexts. Insisting that governments regulate efficiently, therefore, often constitutes an impossible and therefore frequently inappropriate demand.
Indeed, the Coase theorem shows that absent transaction costs, legal rule choices are wholly irrelevant to economic efficiency. 235 For in such a world, Coase tells us private parties would make deals to create efficient outcomes no matter what legal rule we impose. 236 Ironically, a demonstration of efficiency's irrelevance to law helped create the field of law and microeconomics. Of course, we live in a world that has positive transaction costs. 237 As a result, legal rules influence resource allocation. 238 But unless we can predict what private bargains will arise under a given legal framework, we cannot predict whether those outcomes will prove efficient. And we usually cannot predict private bargains well for complex systems. 239 Law's inability to dictate resource allocation to ensure efficient outcomes becomes even clearer in Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral and the vast body of work to which it gave rise. 240 In the Cathedral article, Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed unified tort and property theory by discussing the choice between protecting rights with property rules (i.e. with injunctions) and protecting them with liability rules (payment of damages). 241 This framework, while developed in the context of nuisance law, provides a broad metaphor for a wide variety of areas of law. 242 The Cathedral article and the vast literature that followed in its wake recognize that judges often cannot allocate resources efficiently, because they lack sufficient information. 243 Hence, the literature growing up in the shadow of the Cathedral 244 tended to imagine that a judge issues an order that does not itself produce an efficient outcome and asks whether a property or liability rule would best support private bargaining to reach an efficient solution by rearranging the judge's allocation of rights. 245 This way of understanding the problem at least implicitly recognizes that private parties can compensate for inefficient decisions even when the legal decision only influences two parties. 246 It thus recognizes that legal decision-makers, even in an individual case not characterized by the complexity of the systems this Article focuses on, often cannot get enough information to make efficient choices but instead provide a framework against which parties can seek efficient bargains. 247 Many scholars writing in the Cathedral's shadow claim that they can predict which rules lead to efficient outcomes, not because they imagine judges have enough information to create efficient rules, but because they believe that scholars can predict which rules will lead to private bargaining or adjustment of entitlements to produce an efficient outcome. 248 But their beliefs about which rules lead to efficient outcomes often diverge rather sharply. 249 Furthermore, even in the simple contexts central to the Cathedral literature (relative to the cases this Article focuses on), many scholars recognize that judges will have trouble getting enough information to predict which rule will lead to efficient private bargains after judgment. 250 In more complex contexts, they recognize that the informational burdens limiting efficient outcomes become extremely formidable. 247. See Ayres & Goldblart, supra note 240, at 19 (noting that "judicial selection of an initial entitlement holder does not determine allocative efficiency"); Craswell, supra note 240, at 21-26 (discussing how courts rarely possess sufficient information to dictate efficient results in contract cases); Epstein, supra note 235, at 2093 (favoring property rules because judges cannot determine the correct level of damages to efficiently compensate the loser of a property right); Polinsky, supra note 240, at 1080 (stating that under realistic assumptions about imperfect information one cannot determine whether a property or liability rule is superior).
248. See, e.g., Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 240, at 8 (proposing assigning liability to the party who is the most efficient chooser of whether to pay or give up a right); Epstein, supra note 235, at 2093-94 (arguing that private bargaining should work fine absent a monopoly position leading to a holdout problem and therefore commending reliance on property rules in most situations); cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 240, at 720 (stating that when bargaining is possible but not always successful because of misunderstandings it is impossible to determine whether liability or property rules are best).
249. See Rose, supra note 244, at 2189 (noting a disagreement between Kaplow and Shavell on the one hand and Ayres and Talley with respect to the efficiency of competing rules applicable to externality problems); see also Merges, supra note 240, at 1304 (characterizing his conclusions as "counter to much of the contemporary scholarly work in the contemporary entitlements literature"); cf. Epstein, supra note 235, at 2092-94 (strongly favoring property rules absent a holdout problem as efficient); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 240, at 719 (disagreeing with prior commentators' conclusion that liability rules are inferior to property rules when damages are uncertain).
250. See James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, The Cathedral at Twenty-Five: Citations and Impressions, 106 YALE L.J. 2121, 2135 (1997) (arguing that the choice of liability over property rules should hinge on a comparison between judicial assessment costs associated with assigning liability and the costs of private bargaining under a property rule, but determining which is higher is very difficult in the context of litigation); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 240, at 732-37 (finding that when externalities are present but private bargaining is possible, the choice between property and liability rules is a wash).
251. See Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 240, at 64-66 (commending a weighing of numerosity and informational advantages pointing in opposite directions in choosing liability rules and conceding that in some contexts adding one additional party makes it very hard for a court to implement an efficient liability regime); Merges, supra note 240, at 1306 (noting the difficulty of establishing an efficient liability rule for intellectual property because of valuation problems). The Journal of Corporation Law [Vol. 40:1 particular, they recognize that bargaining, which this literature usually treats as the means of reaching efficient outcomes, often becomes impossible in such contexts. 252 In saying that complexity and institutional considerations defeat efforts to achieve efficiency in practice, I mean only to say that they defeat efforts to achieve allocative efficiency. Law and economics scholars sometimes can identify the most cost effective means of achieving a regulatory goal. 253 In other words, even when law and economics cannot identify optimal goals for law, it can determine the cheapest way of meeting any particular legal goal.
Furthermore, lawyers can sometimes show that a particular measure achieves nothing and therefore cannot be efficient because it imposes costs with no benefits. 254 These cases, however, are rare. The run-up to the financial crisis shows that a lot of people argued for destructive deregulation by claiming that under standard neoclassical assumptions, the regulation delivered no benefits. 255 That kind of argument is incorrect and dangerous, since neoclassical assumptions, while sometimes useful for scholars, can prove very misleading in describing market actors' behavior. In rare cases, however, empirical studies of causal relationships can show that a particular proposal delivers no benefits but imposes costs. 256 In such cases, however, one does not need either a CBA or an efficiency framework to show that the proposal merits rejection. Nor do I necessarily mean to deny that we have made some progress in the literature growing up in the shadow of the Cathedral in evaluating the relative theoretical efficiency of different forms of rules. 257 But in complex contexts, those choices often amount to choices among two rules that are likely to be far off the mark with respect to efficiency. Complexity makes the calculation of costs and benefits of both property and liability rules deeply problematic, while usually ruling out the kind of bargaining that might lead to efficient results in a simpler context. 258
IV. TOWARD LAW AND MACROECONOMICS
Since laws create frameworks influencing resource allocation in complex ways, they operate like macroeconomic decisions (e.g. monetary policy), which likewise influence but do not control resource allocation. They also resemble macroeconomic policy in the sense 252. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 240, at 749 (explaining that there are a lot of pollution victims so coordination among them is difficult); cf. Merges, supra note 240, at 1302-04 (noting that collective private associations sometimes provide proxies for private bargaining where transaction costs make individual bargains prohibitively expensive in the intellectual property context).
253. See Driesen, supra note 180, at 15-16 (indicating the cost-effective principle tends to favor environmental benefit trading as the least costly measure for achieving abatement targets).
254. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 199, at 323-39 (showing that a very long copyright term creates no benefits).
255. See, e.g., Shughart, supra note 95, at 612 (arguing for Glass-Steagall's repeal because it imposed costs with "no apparent benefits for depositors").
256. See Breyer, supra note 199, at 323-39 (discussing empirical information about the incentives of copyright terms extending beyond an author's lifetime).
257. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 240, at 751, 774 (arguing that pollution taxes are more efficient than tradable permits and claiming that their article clarifies "conceptual understanding of property rules versus liability rules").
258. See, e.g., id. at 750 (pointing out that in the pollution context difficulties in assessing harm pose as great a problem for calibration of property rules as for calibration of liability rules).
of having only indirect and difficult to calculate impacts on markets even in contexts where they only influence part of the economy, rather than the whole. 259 Hence, a macroeconomic legal theory might work better than the microeconomic approach, especially in complex contexts. 260 I wrote a book-The Economic Dynamic Analysis of Law-developing a specific macroeconomic approach to law, which I call an economic dynamic approach. 261 I confine myself here to a brief sketch of the main ideas leaving further defense of this approach to the book. But since one cannot optimize the regulation of a dynamic system that makes frequent changes anyway, and even if one could, the achievement would prove temporary and therefore trivial, we need to create a law and economics that works for law, not just markets. My main goal here involves suggesting that a plausible alternative to law and microeconomics exists.
A good macroeconomic approach must make appropriate use of the information that experts provide by focusing on the shape of change over time. Legal change frequently counteracts negative economic dynamics. 262 So, we need to analyze what direction we are headed in and counter important negative developments when a government response has promise. 263 This contrasts with a focus on law as a mere transaction.
The goal of a macroeconomic approach useful for a variety of areas of law involves avoiding systemic risks while keeping open a reasonably robust set of economic opportunities. 264 I argue below that these goals are both more meaningful and more achievable than the goal of economic efficiency.
Finally, in analyzing trends potentially meriting legal remedies we should employ economic dynamic analysis-a form of institutional economic analysis used by leading scholars but not yet formally recognized. This approach, as we shall see, can help us see and avoid systemic risks while giving us meaningful information about a legal rule's consequences. The material below first discusses the changes in focus, goals, and methods sketched above and then closes with some general comments about the economic dynamic theory's limits and possible objections (which receive more thorough treatment in The Economic Dynamics of Law). 260. By a macroeconomic legal theory, as will become evident below, I mean something different from simple application of existing monetary policy to law. Cf. Kelman, supra note 11 (explaining why existing macroeconomics focused primarily on monetary policy does not help legal theory very much). Rather, I advocate use of macroeconomic goals to reorient law and economics combined with techniques aimed at enhancing our ability to have law contribute something to these goals' realization apart from the monetary policy that has dominated conventional macroeconomics.
261. DRIESEN, supra note 10. 262. See, e.g., id. at 50 (showing that policymakers implemented policies shifting the direction in which our economy was headed-"straight down"-following the start of the financial crisis).
263. See id. at 51 (defining the institutional economic concept of "path dependence," which focuses on evaluating the direction of the path that society is on, and stressing the concept's importance).
264. See id. at 6-7; DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 81 (1990) (arguing for the goal of "adaptive efficiency"-maximizing our future flexibility to enable growth and experimentation); cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST CASE SCENARIOS 10 (2007) (suggesting that societies will likely reach "incompletely theorized agreements" to take action when facing likely catastrophes). The Journal of Corporation Law [Vol. 40:1
A. Focusing on the Shape of Change Over Time
Analysts should focus their attention on the shape of change over time, rather than on near term costs and benefits. 265 The economists and law professors who predicted the financial crisis focused on the direction of changes they were observing and recommended policy measures that would have ameliorated or avoided the crisis. 266 Similarly, policymakers prevented the crisis from being worse by bailing out or nationalizing banks. In doing this, they did not calculate the costs and benefits of bank rescues. They could not calculate the economic benefits of preventing large financial institutions' failure or foresee the ultimate cost (after potential repayments) of financial rescues. They did, however, observe that we were headed in the wrong direction and that absent some kind of intervention, we were headed toward a drastic depression. This is but one example of cases where understanding the dynamics of systems proves better than treating legal decisions as if they are ordinary transactions. Law exists in part to correct market actors' myopia, not to mimic it. So, focusing on the shape of change over time provides us with an appropriate focus for designing legal reforms.
B. Avoiding Systemic Risk While Keeping Open a Reasonably Robust Set of Economic Opportunities
We cannot expect government to magically produce a static equilibrium in a complex world. But we do expect governments to avoid man-made disasters. That basic minimum expectation justifies attention to national security, but it also plays a role in financial regulation, climate disruption law, and much else. 267 Hence, a basic economic goal of government involves avoiding systemic risk.
Economists typically use the term "systemic risk" to denote risks of serious economywide problems-those producing widespread major declines in output and employment. 268 But the term literally refers to other kinds of systems as well. Hence, the goal of avoiding systemic risks refers to avoiding risks of the collapse of key ecological, political, and social systems as well. 269 This goal of avoiding systemic risk matters a lot more than the goal of achieving a static equilibrium. A model of an optimal market may prove very useful in the study of markets. But equilibria come and go as technology and other factors change, and therefore make achievement of optimality an elusive and relatively unimportant goal for laws regulating complex systems. Richard Posner has defended economic efficiency as a cause of "wealth maximization." 270 But economic change through innovation matters far more to economic growth than efficiency. 271 This move of claiming that efficiency maximizes wealth conflates the macroeconomic goal of growth with the microeconomic goal of efficiency. 272 In any event, absent collapse of a major system, people can innovate and carry out activities that make things better. Once a major system collapses, however, their options become very limited. By contrast, inefficiency exists all the time in the economy and, while undesirable, this inefficiency does not constitute an insurmountable impediment to needed growth and change. 273 Indeed, inefficiency plays an important role in the creative process that produces innovations increasing wealth. 274 Amazon, for example, engaged in numerous inefficient money-losing transactions in order to establish e-commerce as a viable business. 275 Other innovations require experimentation producing horrific losses before they prove successful. 276 A willingness to experiment, which plays an important role in innovation, implies the possibility of inefficient business ventures producing failures. Not only does success often depend upon failure, but the whole theory of a perfect market is in some tension with the dynamics of innovation that produce economic growth. Economists debating market structure have pointed out that a perfectly efficient economy would not produce the profits necessary to fund research and development. 277 One need not settle the debate between proponents of large business and advocates of more competitive markets with many small players as innovation drivers to see that the lack of profit in a perfectly efficient economy would hinder capital formation needed for research and development.
That said, in choosing how to avoid systemic risks, we must try to keep open a reasonably robust set of economic opportunities. We would not want to create one catastrophe as we sought to avoid another. And, in some areas of law, intellectual property and antitrust, for example, the goal of keeping open a robust set of economic opportunities will matter more than systemic risk avoidance. Law cannot achieve perfectly efficient The Journal of Corporation Law [Vol. 40:1 outcomes in regulatory areas of great complexity, but it usually can help us avoid systemic risk while keeping open a reasonably robust set of economic opportunities.
C. Economic Dynamic Analysis
An economic dynamic approach not only involves macroeconomic goals and a focus on change over time, but also development of methods appropriate for future-oriented economic analysis useful for legal decision-making. The method I have identified builds on a key insight of traditional law and economics, namely that economic incentives are important. 278 This insight has been so widely accepted that nobody thinks about it much. This inattention often produces primitive analysis that simply points out that law X creates an incentive to do Y and stops there. But really good analysts do not usually stop there; they carry out what I call an economic dynamic analysis of law. This approach provides a systematic way to both detect trends requiring countervailing measures and to appreciate the potential consequences of proposed legal reforms.
An example will help make economic dynamic analysis more concrete. The United States tax code often taxes married couples at a higher rate than the two spouses would pay if they remained single. 279 The standard "analysis" simply points out that the "tax on marriage" creates an incentive to remain single and stops there.
An economic dynamic approach, however, demands that we take into account the bounded rationality of the institutions or individuals a given law regulates in order to see if they will pay attention to the incentives law creates. Nobody has enough time to pay attention to all nominally relevant incentives, so individuals and institutions usually only pay attention to the information that their habits, routines, and identities make relevant. So, in this example, an analyst should ask whether couples contemplating marriage consider the tax code. If not, then the law will not discourage marriage.
Even if it turns out that couples study the tax code carefully before deciding whether to tie the knot, one would want to ask if countervailing incentives would ameliorate or even cancel out the law's effects. Perhaps love and desire (in this example) countervail the tax codes enticements to remain single. Thus, consideration of countervailing incentives helps predict the actual effect of economic incentives.
These core elements of considering the precise bounds of rationality influencing discrete groups of regulated actors and countervailing incentives offer a coherent approach to improving a lot of law and economic analysis. I have explained elsewhere that Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner tacitly employ such an approach in order to develop widely admired insights into default rules in corporate and contract law. 280 I have also shown that the economic dynamic approach lies at the heart of the most insightful analysis of very complex laws governing new source review under the Clean Air Act. 281 These elements seem simple, but their deployment constitutes a major improvement over much economic analysis of law.
I have also shown that the analysts who predicted the financial crisis, including the economists Nouriel Roubini and Dean Baker and the legal scholars Arthur Wilmarth and Lynn Stout, basically used an analysis of economic dynamics to see this. 282 I do not mean to suggest that this method's use ensures prescience. But focusing on the shape of change over time and systematically examining the economic dynamics of a system with attention to institutional considerations greatly increases the likelihood of spotting significant problems. Conversely, putting a lot of energy into quantitative modeling can create an inordinate focus on good data sets that make it easy to miss qualitatively important information.
Richard Posner's effort to retrospectively cast market behavior creating a crisis as rational only heightens the defects of a flat rational actor model as a guide to legal reform. One can, if one likes, call exuberance during a bubble and fear during a panic rational after the fact. But unless one actually builds these specific behaviors into models seeking to map out the consequences of developing trends (or responses to proposed laws) before they have played out, the model will miss them. After the crisis, Posner endorsed Keynes, a macroeconomist who wrote about the effects of "animal spirits" on markets. 283 But that concession implies that analysts must consider which behaviors Posner considers rational will likely prevail in varying circumstances and take them into account. In other words, defining the bounds of rationality for relevant groups matters. 284
D. Economic Dynamics' Limits and Some Potential Objections
One might think that economic dynamic theory has nothing at all to say outside of the complex areas I addressed here. I am here focused on areas characterized by complexity where regulations often address a large number of potential transactions at one blow-like financial regulation, intellectual property, and environmental law. But I explained elsewhere that the economic dynamic approach can apply to common law areas like property and contract. 285 Dynamic problems do arise in these areas. For example, contract enforcement cases usually arise because something happens after contract formation that makes contemplated performance unattractive. 286 In other words, enforcement occurs when a transaction that both parties once thought would prove Pareto optimal ceases to be so. In that case, the typical role of courts involves enforcement of inefficient transactions. 287 I argued that for that reason we might understand contract law as an effort to provide a robust set of economic opportunities, rather than as an effort to achieve 288 Even if law and microeconomics illuminates some common law issues, the economic dynamic approach still casts fresh light on some old problems and calls our attention to some new ones. The economic dynamic approach has value even in cases where we must make economic efficiency a goal, such as in regimes regulating the delivery of essential services (e.g. regulation of utilities). It helps us see and critically evaluate questions about tradeoffs between static efficiency and economic growth, like whether we have found the right balance between cheap telecommunication services and support for adequate investment in innovation. 289 In evaluating questions like these, we need both careful empirical studies that go beyond simply assuming that "competition" ensures good outcomes (especially in industries characterized by limited competition). We need to look at the economic dynamics of relevant systems and whether specific reforms might help make those systems perform better.
My argument that even in avoiding systemic risks society must keep open a robust set of economic opportunities opens up some questions about how to take into account the collateral negative consequences of avoiding systemic risk. By questioning the efficiency goal for law in complex contexts, I do not mean to imply that law should not take into account the advantages and disadvantages of competing legal reforms. I just mean to claim that equating costs and benefits at the margin does not work for reforms addressing complex matters subject to change over time.
My previous work on economic dynamics points to several possible techniques for responding to potential negative collateral consequences. One involves choosing alternatives that effectively address systemic risk without shutting off crucial economic opportunities when possible. 290 Another involves building exceptions into legal reforms to eliminate potential disadvantages. 291 I also argue that in those few cases when all available methods of avoiding significant systemic risk creates other systemic risks, one can sometimes make judgments based on the relative likelihood of the risk manifesting itself, even though the magnitudes of consequences or of probabilities are unknown. 292 The Economic Dynamics of Law works through potential objections to the economic dynamic approach in greater detail. 293 My primary goal in this Article, however, involves calling attention to how complexity and institutional considerations defeat allocative efficiency as a predominant goal for laws governing complex systems. The economic dynamic approach described shows that we can adapt macroeconomic thinking, where we counter negative trends and try to create economic opportunity, to legal reform. This means that we can have a theory that focuses on important and often achievable goals. 292. See id. at 71-72 (using the example of the choice between deploying nuclear power and facing climate disruption to illustrate this problem).
293. See id. at 68-78 (discussing some potential objections and providing additional detailed support).
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In a host of legal areas, complex dynamics defeat efforts to achieve optimality. They do so both because the phenomena under analysis defy quantitative analysis and because government regulation usually provides a general framework yielding uncertain results. At least in these areas, we need to abandon as unrealistic and myopic the habit of treating law as if it were a mere transaction controlling allocation of a set of resources.
Instead, we need to focus law and economics on the important goals of avoiding systemic risk while keeping open a reasonably robust set of economic opportunities. I have proposed an economic dynamic approach that fleshes out what such a macroeconomic approach might look like if adapted to law's needs. The financial crisis teaches us that the old approach to regulating complex systems failed. We desperately need an approach to law and economics that treats law as an institution that addresses the complex problems that society actually confronts in an appropriate and realistic way.
